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Introduction 
 
Big Society Capital (BSC) is a financial institution set up for the purpose of building 
the market for social investment in the UK. BSC defines social investment as ‘the use 
of repayable finance to achieve a social as well as a financial return’. Its ultimate aim 
is to help ‘capitalise’ and support third sector organisations, described by them as 
‘social sector organisations’ (SSOs). BSC does this, primarily, by developing and 
promoting the social investment marketplace in the United Kingdom. It acts as a 
wholesale institution, making capital investment into social investment finance 
intermediaries (SIFIs) that then go on to invest in frontline SSOs. After a significant 
period of planning, BSC began operations in April 2012. Since then, BSC has played 
a key role in developing the UK social investment market, both as market participant 
and market champion. Despite owing its existence to significant government policy 
support, BSC is an independent financial institution operating separate from the UK 
government. BSC represents the first wholesale social investment bank in the world 
and has created a model that a number of other countries are looking to follow. This 
case study tells this story of the development and design of BSC.  
BSC came into being as the consequence of over a decade of work by a group of 
individuals on both the inside and outside of government. This work was undertaken 
by a committed and persistent group of individuals through a variety of initiatives. 
Many of these individuals were well established in their own fields, were powerful 
and well connected and, in some cases, had influence at the highest levels of British 
politics. It is important to emphasise from the outset the importance of this group in 
the success of creating BSC. Their persistence and influence ensured that the 
objective of founding a social investment wholesale bank was pursued successfully, 
despite considerable obstacles along the way.  
This case study examines the various initiatives, policies and strategies that were 
relevant to BSC’s creation, as well as the rationales behind them. It describes the 
process of setting BSC up and the challenges faced in getting things up and running. 
It is hoped that this analysis will be useful reading for practitioners, policymakers and 
students interested in understanding BSC and for the wider social investment market 
internationally in terms of offering insights into an innovative model of a wholesale 
banking institution. 
The case study is based on interviews with 14 senior figures involved in the creation 
and setting up of BSC and participant observation of several BSC board meetings, 
supplemented by a thorough analysis of numerous internal documents and secondary 
data. Throughout, where no source is stated, quotations in italics are taken from the 
key informant interviews, which have been treated as anonymous. 
Social Investment 
 
As well as the story of BSC as an institution, this case study is the story of the growth 
of social investment as a new capital market model that has gained traction over the 
past 10-15 years. The broader concept of social investment has been a feature of the 
UK policy context since at least 2000. The early incarnations of the idea were 
concerned with the need to build the capacity of SSOs in the UK to take on more 
contract-based delivery of public services. However, at this stage, the idea of a 
financial institution set up explicitly for the needs of the social sector had not been put 
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forward. In wider social policy discourses, ‘social investment’ was understood to 
mean investing in welfare interventions early to have greater long-term effects. 
Aligned to this, social investment also became associated with models of investing 
that aimed to build capacity among what, at the time, was called the ‘third sector’. 
 
One of the flagship initiatives developing this strand of work was the Social 
Investment Task Force (SITF), which was established in 2000. The SIFT was an 
initiative chaired by Sir Ronald Cohen, the Chairman of Apax Partners and de facto 
founding father of the Venture Capital industry in the UK as well as a notable 
philanthropist. The SITF was formed in response to a call from the then Labour 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown for a re-assessment of the role of finance 
and economics in community development. Specifically, SITF was set up to 
undertake: 
 
An urgent but considered assessment of the ways in which the UK can achieve 
a radical improvement in its capacity to create wealth, economic growth, 
employment and an improved social fabric in its most under-invested, that is 
to say its poorest, communities.
1
 
 
At this point, the focus of activity was on creating ‘community development finance 
institutions’ (CDFIs), a group of organisations licensed by central government to try 
to ‘inject’ capital into poor neighbourhoods. The emphasis was on boosting 
entrepreneurialism and introducing loans to grow local economic activity and jobs.  
 
The SITF ran from 2000 to 2010. The original membership comprised seven 
individuals from the private and social sectors: by the end of the commission in 2010 
a further eight individuals had also taken part (see Appendix 1). The objectives of the 
SITF were set out in its first report in 2000, these included:  
 
 A Community Investment Tax Credit to encourage private investment in 
community development to be invested in both profit-seeking and not-for-
profit enterprises in under-invested communities 
 Community Development Venture Funds (CDFVs) structured as matched 
funding partnerships between government and the venture capital industry, 
entrepreneurs, institutional investors and banks  
 Disclosure of individual bank lending activities in under-invested 
communities, possibly via new legislation  
 Greater latitude and encouragement for charitable trusts and foundations to 
invest in community development initiatives, even where these include a 
significant for-profit element 
 Creation of effective trade association to support Community Development 
Financial Institutions, including Community Development Banks, Community 
Loan Funds, Micro-Loan Funds and Community Development Venture Funds 
 
                                               
1
 Social Investment Taskforce (2000), Enterprising Communities: Wealth Beyond Welfare, 
SITF, p.2 
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According to subsequent reports from SITF,
2
 the most successful areas of activity 
were as follows: 
 
 The first CDVF, Bridges Ventures, was set up in 2002 with £20m of matched 
investment from the Government. Bridges went on to attract tens of millions 
of pounds of further investment from the private sector 
 The Charity Commission issued guidance in 2001 and 2002 lending its 
support to social investment and clarifying the situations in which charities are 
able to make social investments 
 In 2002 a trade association for CDFIs was established, the Community 
Development Finance Association (CDFA), which came to represent the 
majority of CDFIs.  
 
In contrast: 
 
 While Community Investment Tax Relief (CITR) became operational in 2003, 
by March 2009 it had attracted only £58m against a target of £200m. The 
shortfall was attributed to ‘the restrictive nature of the criteria imposed by the 
Government on use of the facility’ (SITF 2010, p10) 
 It proved very difficult to persuade banks to publish data on how lending 
varied across different regions of the UK. Only incremental improvements 
were made in this area 
 Take-up of social investment from charitable foundations was low over this 
period 
 
Overall, however, the work of the SITF laid important groundwork for the 
establishment of the social investment market in the UK. 
 
Alongside the work of the SITF, multiple initiatives were also taking place to expand 
and test the idea of social investment in the UK (see Table 1).  Of these initiatives, the 
Futurebuilders Fund was particularly important in the story of the development of 
BSC.  Futurebuilders was a government initiative designed to provide repayable loans 
to SSOs, with additional support for the skills and knowledge needed to take on this 
kind of finance. The objective was to make SSOs better able to take public sector 
contracts going forward, as part of a wider set of policy objectives around growing the 
social enterprise sector. 
 
  
                                               
2
 Social Investment Taskforce (2005), Enterprising Communities: Wealth Beyond Welfare: A 
2005 update on the Social Investment Task Force; (2010), Social Investment Ten Years On: 
Final Report of the Social Investment Taskforce  
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Initiative Date Investment 
Adventure Capital Fund and Community 
Asset Transfer Fund 
2002 £42m 
Phoenix Fund 2004 £42m 
Financial Inclusion Task Force 2004 n/a 
Futurebuilders 2004 £215m 
Social Enterprise Investment Fund 2007 £100m 
Community Builders Fund 2009 £70m 
The first Social Impact Bond 2010 £7m 
Transition Fund 2010 £100m 
  
Table 1: Notable UK Social Investment Policy (2000-2010) 
 
In December 2003 the government awarded the contract to run the fund to a 
consortium made up of Charity Bank, Unity Trust Bank, the National Council for 
Voluntary Organizations and the Northern Rock Foundation. This consortium 
struggled from the outset to find enough organisations that were in a position to take 
on loan finance and failed to meet targets for distribution of such funds, in many cases 
offering grants instead of debt. As a result, in 2007, the second phase of the contract 
was awarded to a different fund manager - The Adventure Capital Fund (later the 
Social Investment Business). However, despite a clearer focus on debt investment, the 
new fund manager responded to political pressure to ensure that the money was 
distributed promptly by relaxing many of the terms of the lending arrangements.
3
 As a 
result, the money was distributed in much higher volumes, but many commentators 
felt that the relaxed terms undermined the core purpose of Futurebuilders, which was 
to build the capacity of the social sector to take on repayable finance.
4
 As one 
interviewee commented: 
The organisation that ran Futurebuilders in the beginning lost that tender and 
what is now the Social Investment Business won it. And the rules had changed 
so that the extent to which money was repaid ceased to be a key performance 
indicator, so weakening the whole principle of Futurebuilders, which was that 
it was a loan fund. …. If you remove that as a key performance indicator, then 
people won’t see it as anything other than a source of grants. So 
Futurebuilders was a great frustration to some of us 
Despite these shortcomings, Futurebuilders, together with the wider work of the SITF, 
ensured that a culture of repayable finance became familiar to at least some portion of 
                                               
3
 Brown, A. Behrens, L., and Schuster, A. (2015), A Tale of Two Funds: The Management 
and Performance of the Futurebuilders-England Fund, BCG 
4
 In practice, Futurebuilders had a fairly low default rate and it was Communitybuilders that 
lost most money.The same criticisms were raised against a subsequent government 
capitalized fund run by the Social Investment Business – the £100m Social Enterprise 
Investment Fund that ran from 2008-2012 (see See Alcock, P., Hall, K., Millar, R., Nicholls, 
A., Lyon, F., and Gabriel, M. (2010), Start-up and Growth: National Evaluation of the Social 
Enterprise Fund, TSCR. 
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the social sector, and that policymakers had some awareness of what is and is not 
effective in encouraging such culture change. This project also highlighted the need 
for market discipline in managing social investment funds if they were to prove both 
sustainable and to contribute to a broader market building agenda. 
A Social Investment Bank 
 
Over the same period the idea of a financial institution set up explicitly to further 
social investment began to take shape. Such a so-called ‘social investment bank’ 
would act as a source of finance to capitalise the social sector.  
 
In the early 2000s, the potential of the capital available from ‘dormant’ bank accounts 
began to attract interest from leaders in the UK’s social sector. Following the 
precedent set in other countries, including Ireland, interest began to grow in the idea 
that money that had been left dormant in bank accounts for 15 years or more could be 
extracted from the UK’s high street banks and directed towards other, more socially 
beneficial, purposes. Early estimates indicated that there was potentially a large 
amount of money in such accounts, amounting to hundreds of millions of pounds. 
These discussions prompted a group of individuals to set up an independent 
Commission on Unclaimed Assets. 
 
The Commission on Unclaimed Assets and the Dormant Bank Accounts Act 
 
In 2005, the Commission on Unclaimed Assets (CUA), which was also chaired by Sir 
Ronald Cohen, brought together a group of experts from the banking, finance, 
consumer protection and social sectors to work in partnership with the Treasury, the 
Department of Communities and Local Government, and the Home Office to address 
three main issues: reuniting customers with their money and consumer protection; the 
transfer of unclaimed assets to a new entity; and the best use of such unclaimed assets 
(the main focus of their work). The CUA ran until 2007. 
 
The Commissioners were largely chosen as individuals who were already supportive 
of social investment, as one Commissioner noted: 
 
I mean, bluntly, the Commission chose people who shared our values and our 
perspective, who absolutely understood the potential of social investment 
Five of the nine members of the CUA had also been members of the SITF (see 
Appendix 2). 
At this stage, the Labour Government had already stated that the unclaimed assets 
money should be directed towards ‘engaging young people, financial education and 
inclusion and community   regeneration’.5 The CUA was set up separately from 
government to build the case for directing this money towards social investment as 
the preferred approach to addressing social issues.   
                                               
5
 The Commission on Unclaimed Assets (2006), A Social Investment Bank Consultation 
Paper, CUA, p. 1. 
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Research commissioned by the CUA demonstrated the severity of need in deprived 
communities in the UK, and the state of undercapitalisation of the social sector, as a 
Commission member noted: 
Although the Commission’s report had some data which is probably a bit 
flaky, it was strong enough to show fairly clearly that you were looking at a 
sector which was never going to have, in the present scheme of things, enough 
capital to pay for scaling up or professional development or investment in 
growth 
The CUA made the argument that the social sector needed investment in its capacity 
and infrastructure and that making it more financially sustainable would put it in a 
stronger position to achieve the desired social change. The report echoed many of the 
sentiments and recommendations of the SITF work. 
In addition, the CUA put forward a more detailed set of ideas than had previously 
been published for a wholesale financial institution set up to serve the social sector – a 
‘social investment bank’. The wholesale model would mean that the new institution 
would avoid being in competition with existing providers of social investment capital. 
It would, instead, make co-investments into these intermediary bodies, building the 
variety and capacity of intermediaries and, ultimately, increasing the supply of capital 
to the social sector overall.
6
 
Following the publication of this report, the focus of activity shifted to the passing of 
an Act of Parliament that would release dormant accounts from the high street banks 
for public benefit. The CUA was successful in its lobbying and in 2008, the 
government passed the Dormant Bank and Building Society Accounts Act 2008. The 
Act is a critical part of the story of the creation of BSC. The majority of the Act set 
out the definition of a ‘dormant account’ and the conditions under which individuals 
might reclaim any funds owed to them after the 15-year dormant period had passed. 
The Act also set out the legitimate uses for such capital, as follows: 
 
A distribution of dormant account money for meeting English expenditure must be – 
 
(a) Made for meeting expenditure on or connected with the provision of services, 
facilities or opportunities to meet the needs of young people  
(b) Made for meeting expenditure on or connected with—    
(i) The development of individuals’ ability to manage their finances, or  
(ii) The improvement of access to personal financial services, or 
(c) Made to a social investment wholesaler
7…‘Social investment wholesaler’ means a 
body that exists to assist or enable other bodies to give financial or other support to 
third sector organisations:‘third sector organisation’ means an organisation that 
exists wholly or mainly to provide benefits for society or the environment 
 
It is notable that the use of funds to support the social investment bank was listed as 
only one of three potential uses for the dormant bank account funds. The Secretary of 
State for Children, Schools and Families was ultimately responsible for the 
                                               
6
 See further: The Commission on Unclaimed Assets (2007), The Social Investment Bank: Its 
Organization and Role in Driving Development of the Third Sector, CUA  
7
 Dormant Bank and Building Society Accounts Act 2008, p. 10 
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legislation. As a consequence, at this stage, the proportion of unclaimed assets that 
might ultimately be directed towards a new social investment institution was unclear. 
Nevertheless, with the Act in place, the main legal barrier to establishing a social 
investment bank in the UK had been removed.  
 
In July 2009, the Cabinet Office within the UK government published a consultation 
on the functions and design of a Social Investment Wholesale Bank.
8
 Following the 
consultation, the December 2009 Pre-Budget Report reported that:  
 
By Budget 2010, Government will finalise the model for the Bank …. To fund its 
initial capitalisation, the Government announces its intention to commit £75 million 
of the funds expected to be released through the Dormant Accounts Scheme in 
England…the Co-operative Financial Services (CFS) has agreed to support the 
Government and industry efforts…by preparing a plan for the establishment of the 
Reclaim Fund. The CFS intend…to establish and administrate the Reclaim Fund9 
 
From Labour to Coalition Government 
 
The last years of the Labour Government were a crucial period for the leading social 
investment advocates in the UK. Many of the individuals involved had traditionally 
been affiliated with the Labour Party – in particular, Sir Ronald Cohen (though a 
former Liberal Party Parliamentary candidate in the 1970s) was famous as a high 
profile donor to Labour. However, by early 2010, it was looking increasingly likely 
that Labour would lose power in the forthcoming election. As a result, the focus 
shifted to lobbying discussions with the then Opposition Conservative Party. Contact 
was made at the highest level of the Party, as one interviewee commented: 
 
I had a conversation with David Cameron… I also had a long conversation 
with Steve Hilton, who was a chief advisor. And [we] had a meeting with 
George Osborne. We also had a meeting with George Osborne’s advisory 
team. So we invested quite a bit of time getting the Conservative Party on 
board 
Contact was also made with the ministers who were likely to be responsible for the 
future social investment bank. Nick Hurd was a key figure in this respect, as he was 
set to assume the position of Minister for Civil Society, along with Francis Maude, as 
prospective Minister for the Cabinet Office, and Oliver Letwin another shadow 
minister. 
An important marker of progress was getting a commitment to use the unclaimed 
assets for a social investment bank into the Conservative’s 2010 election Manifesto: 
We will strengthen and support social enterprises to help deliver our public 
service reforms by creating a Big Society bank, funded from unclaimed bank 
                                               
8
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20100512160912/http:/www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/me
dia/224319/13528%20social%20bank%20web%20bookmarked.pdf. 
9
 HM Treasury (2009), Pre-Budget Report, paras 5.63-5.64. 
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assets, to provide new finance for neighbourhood groups, charities, social 
enterprises and other non- governmental bodies
10
 
The inclusion of this statement provided important political leverage over the coming 
months. As one commentator mentioned: 
One of the civil servants said to me, which I think is very true, is if you want to 
get something done in government, make sure it is in a manifesto. Because 
when it’s in the manifesto, they have to answer to it 
The Manifesto statement also revealed that the Conservative Government’s ‘Big 
Society’ agenda had already, even at this early stage, attached itself to the idea of the 
social investment bank. From this point on the social investment bank became known 
as the ‘Big Society Bank’.  
 
Post 2010 Election 
 
Predictions of a Labour defeat turned out to be correct and the Conservative Party 
came to power in May 2010 as part of a Coalition Government with the Liberal 
Democrats. The new government proved to be even more enthusiastic about social 
investment than had been anticipated. An interviewee observed: 
 
What we couldn’t know was how the Coalition would pick up the idea of the 
social investment bank. I got a call from Francis Maude’s office to go to a 
meeting, and they said ‘Look we opened the drawer of the social investment 
bank, because we think this is interesting concept and we like to support it but 
there’s nothing there’ 
The idea of a social investment bank was immediately popular with Conservative 
politicians. Several of the key ministers had backgrounds in investment and banking, 
and, so, were familiar with both the mechanisms of finance and the mechanisms of 
government: they were well placed to see the potential inherent in the idea of a social 
investment wholesale bank. Furthermore, it was an idea that was compatible with the 
new policy emphasis on ‘austerity’; as one interviewee remarked: 
So, basically [the Conservatives] knew they were going to come in, and have 
no money, but one thing that they could do is launch something funded with 
someone else’s money … what they said to me is ‘this couldn't be a more 
Conservative idea’ 
Moreover, the period immediately after an election was seen as well suited to a 
project of this kind: 
It’s easy there [just after an election] to talk about radically new ideas 
because you don’t get the question of ‘well, if this is so great why didn’t you 
think of it ten years ago?’… The other thing you don’t get is that you don’t 
have to prove whether it is working or not because it is new. So I think there 
was a lot more willingness to see whether things like payment by results, 
social investments, etc, would work 
                                               
10
 Conservative Party (2010), An Invitation to Join the Government of Britain, p.37. 
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A productive relationship was quickly established between the new government and 
key social investment advocates. It was at this stage, towards the end of 2010, that the 
new government invited Sir Ronald Cohen and Nick O’Donohoe to design a strategy 
further to develop the UK social investment market.
11
 O’Donohoe was the former 
head of global research for JP Morgan investment bank who had become interested in 
social investment after working on a key piece of research on impact investing for the 
bank in collaboration with the Rockefeller Foundation and the Global Impact 
Investing Network (GIIN).
12
 
 
Formalising The Big Society Bank 
 
Following the publication of the strategy document, the next step was for the Big 
Society Bank development process to be formalised. The government was required to 
promote an open tendering process by which any group or organisation would be able 
to submit a proposal to run the Big Society Bank. It was clear, however, that the 
ministers and civil servants in control of this process wanted the team they had 
already been working with to be awarded the contract – namely Cohen and 
O’Donohoe. If they received multiple proposals the process would become much 
more complicated. The government, therefore, minimised the chances of any other 
groups becoming aware of the opportunity to submit a proposal by ensuring the tender 
was not widely promoted or advertised, as one interviewee said: 
 
The government had sort of realised that was a risk, … once they had said that 
we [the existing group] were going to write in this blueprint, anybody could 
have stood up and said I’m going to write a blueprint too. … and then had 
somebody else done that they would have to have had a consultation and all 
the rest of it, which would slow down the project a lot. So they were sitting 
there, desperately hoping...and I remember every time I met with them, they’d 
say sort of, are there any sort of whispers out there that somebody else might 
be thinking of it? 
During the first few months of 2011, Cohen, O’Donohoe and a number of others 
collaborated on a high-level proposal for the Big Society Bank. At this stage the focus 
was on providing a document that would convince the government that the group was 
capable of taking responsibility for the creation and operation of the bank. By this 
stage O’Donohoe had left his post at JP Morgan and, so, was able to devote the time 
required to drive the planning forward. He was helped by a team of people who were 
already close to the main group of social investment advocates, several of whom were 
seconded from Social Finance, an organisation that had been set up by Cohen in 2007. 
The duo still had no formal agreement with government and had to use their own 
resources to pay for the time spent developing the proposal.  
The Cabinet Office published a strategy to grow the social investment market in 
February 2011 and in March Nick Hurd made a Written Ministerial Statement 
                                               
11
 Cabinet Office (2011), Growing the Social Investment Market: A Vision and Strategy, HM 
Government. 
12
 O’Donohoe, N., Leijonhufvud, C., and Saltuk, Y. (2010). Impact Investments: An Emerging 
Asset Class, J.P. Morgan and Rockefeller Foundation. 
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highlighting the opportunity for others to feed in comments on the development of the 
proposal and the Government’s approach.13 
In May 2011, O’Donohoe and Cohen submitted a 13-page outline proposal to 
government, setting out the future operating principles, objectives, roles and structure 
of the Big Society Bank. The Cabinet Office accepted the proposal. The Big Society 
Bank project could now move towards realization. 
 
Founding The Big Society Bank 
 
At just thirteen pages, the proposal accepted by the Cabinet Office lacked some detail. 
As a consequence, significant amounts of work were needed to translate the proposal 
into operational reality. O’Donohoe and Cohen worked intensively on the project 
from May 2011 until the official launch of BSC in April 2012. In particular, there was 
a range of bureaucratic hurdles that had to be overcome before BSC could be 
launched. Furthermore, during this period the name of the institution was changed 
once more to its eventual form, ‘Big Society Capital’, because the institution did not 
meet the regulatory requirements that must be met when calling an institution a 
‘bank’.14 
 
It was also at this stage that O’Donohoe and Cohen appointed themselves as CEO and 
Chairman of BSC respectively. They made their first appointments too, including 
Caroline Mason as Chief Operating Officer, so that a small core team of staff could 
begin to put everything in place. Figure 1 gives the proposed management structure 
from this document. 
 
                                               
13
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm110321/wmstext/110321
m0001.htm. 
14
 One interviewee also noted that all banks were generally seen as toxic in 2011 following 
the 2008-10 banking crisis, so being seen to found a new bank was politically difficult. This 
was, perhaps, a surprising comment in light of the subsequent establishment of the Green 
Investment Bank. 
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Figure 1: BSC Proposed Management Structure 
Once funding became available, the core team would be recruited to establish a 
Company Limited By Shares (CLS) and a recruitment process would be set in place 
to grow the team over time. The aim was to use existing intermediaries, where 
possible, as a cost-effective alternative to employment plus attract talented individuals 
on secondment from institutions in the social, government, financial and business 
sectors as a way of retaining flexibility, reducing costs and spreading understanding 
of the social sector and social issues. The initial core team comprised about ten, 
largely senior, executives. Overtime, the plan was to grow BSC to 20-25 people. 
At this time there was significant political pressure to make visible progress. Indeed, 
some investments were agreed even before BSC was formally constituted, as one 
interviewee noted:  
The Reclaim Fund [see further below] would start releasing dormant accounts 
in about June of 2011. So [the Government] wanted to immediately start 
making investments. And so they set up an interim committee under the 
auspices of Big Lottery Fund.
15
 And they invited proposals...they were 
desperate to be able to announce that by the end of June they had approved a 
couple of investments… So money was committed before the organisation 
formally existed 
By attaching the ‘Big Society’ label to the social investment bank the project had 
become associated with the success of Prime Minister David Cameron’s wider 
                                               
15 The Big Lottery Fund (BLF) was established in 2004 as a non-governmental organization 
responsible for distributing funds raised by the National Lottery to ‘good causes’.  Over 80 
per cent of its grants go to voluntary and community organizations, but it also makes grants to 
statutory bodies, local authorities and social enterprises. BLF funding focuses on projects 
working in health, education and the environment and the charitable sector. BLF supports  
projects that align with policy objectives set by government, but it does not fund services for 
which government has a statutory responsibility. 
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political agenda. This provided the project with additional visibility and political 
support, but also created significant pressure for it to succeed as well as some risk for 
those not aligned with its agenda. 
Three areas of negotiation were particularly salient at this time: securing a European 
State Aid exemption as a bespoke social sector investor; deciding on a formal 
governance structure to determine the future relationship with the government; 
discussing the terms of an equity investment into the new institution from high street 
banks as a part of the wider Merlin Bank Agreement.
16
 
 
Securing European State Aid Exemption 
 
At this time, members of the European Union were subject to ‘State Aid’ rules that 
restricted the support that national governments could provide to private companies. 
The rules were designed to prevent anti-competitive behaviour, such as public money 
being used to support a company so that it could undercut its competitors in other 
countries. The money directed to BSC through the Dormant Bank Accounts Act meant 
that BSC had to secure an exemption to these rules. Securing State Aid clearance was 
one of the most pressing hurdles to overcome before BSC could be developed further. 
Similar exemptions had been sought in the past by the UK government for the money 
allocated to other social investment initiatives, such as Bridges Community Ventures, 
so there was some precedent to follow. But BSC was due to be capitalized with a 
much larger amount of money and for a much more unusual type of organization than 
previous institutions. Even for straightforward exemption applications, the process 
could take more than a year, so there was a risk that an unusual application of this 
kind could be delayed even further. This was a particular cause for concern in the 
context of the policy pressure to make rapid progress in establishing BSC. 
However, these concerns proved to be unfounded and EU approval came through 
quickly, within eight months. As it happened, at the time, senior bureaucrats within 
the European Union were also pursuing a social business agenda that complemented 
the drive to develop social investment in the UK. A senior member of the team at 
BSC suggested that this focus helped the application move through: 
I was at a meeting in Brussels where I met with the senior official in the 
department who had to approve it [the State Aid exemption] and he said to me 
‘look, we get 2,000 applications for state aid exemptions every year. We are 
not here to get in the way of your application’...and Barnier17 was launching a 
social business initiative at that time, and it was clear that the EU saw this as 
an innovative policy in development and they wanted to support it. It was all—
even though they’d never say it was fast tracked, it was fast-tracked 
By the Spring of 2012, State Aid Exemption for BSC had been agreed. 
                                               
16 ‘Project Merlin’, as it was called, was intended to reform aspects of banking activity such 
as lending, pay and bonuses to improve how banks supported the wider economy [in 
particular lending to SMEs]. This led to a formal agreement between government and the 
banks: the Merlin Agreement. This Agreement covered a variety of topics and had much 
wider significance beyond its role in the creation of BSC. 
17
 European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services. 
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BSC’s Governance Structure 
 
Another crucial set of decisions in creating BSC was around the structure it would 
adopt and its relationship with the government. From the outset, the creators of BSC 
were very clear that it should be as independent from government as was possible.  
This desire for independence was primarily rooted in a dislike of political short-
termism and changes of political will. It was hoped that BSC would be able to pursue 
its mission of building the market for social investment without having to cater to the 
interests of whichever Minister or political party was in power. It was also important 
in the negotiations with the High Street Banks as part of the Merlin Agreement (see 
below) who were keen to see that BSC would be immune from political influence. 
There are at two main routes by which government may exert formal control over an 
organisation: by controlling its funds, and by acting as a regulator. BSC wanted to 
ensure that it was independent on both of these counts.  
 
Financial Independence 
 
The Dormant Bank Accounts Act and the investment from the Merlin Banks meant 
that BSC received no direct funding from the government. The dormant bank 
accounts money acted as a supply of capital that would be continually replenished as 
new accounts cross the 15 year threshold set by the terms of the Act to count as 
‘dormant’ Moreover, this capital was, effectively, at zero cost to BSC since it would 
not have to repay any of it and no interest would be charged to use it.  
 
In practice, the high street banks were required to transfer their dormant accounts 
money to an intermediary special purpose vehicle called the Reclaim Fund established 
by BSC. The Reclaim Fund would then periodically transfer money to the Big Lottery 
Fund for distribution, with the English portion of the money sent to BSC’s principal 
shareholder - the Big Society Trust - to invest in shares in BSC. Before BSC was 
authorised, an Interim Investment Committee was established under the auspices of 
the Big Lottery Fund to make investments on its behalf with the understanding that 
the investments would be transferred to BSC when it became operational.  
 
It is, however, crucial to note that this arrangement remains subject to change. The 
Dormant Bank Accounts Act stated three possible destinations for the funds assigned 
to England and Wales - only one of which was the social investment wholesale bank. 
The Coalition Government decided to make all of the dormant bank accounts money 
(up to £400 million) available for this purpose, but there is nothing to prevent a future 
government from deciding to direct the funds to one of the other two authorised 
purposes. It would be quite straightforward to ‘turn off the tap’ of future capital, as 
one of the interviewees put it, should a future government desire so to do. The long-
term financial independence of BSC remains, therefore, somewhat more precarious 
than it first appears.  
Independence From Regulation 
 
In accordance with UK banking law, the plans for BSC were submitted for scrutiny to 
the Financial Services (now Conduct) Authority to ensure that all financial regulations 
were being appropriately observed. But it was also deemed necessary to ensure that 
BSC was held to account on its stated social mission objectives as well as financial 
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structure. The government wanted assurance that there would be mechanisms in place 
for ensuring that BSC would, indeed, make only ‘social’ investments.  
 
One of the most obvious options would be for BSC to be set up as an asset-locked 
Community Interest Company (CIC), a new legal form created in 2005 that was 
designed for hybrid social enterprise organizations. There already existed a CIC 
Regulator, which could have taken on the role of overseeing BSC. However, this 
option was dismissed because it was felt that BSC’s size would make it a distorting 
presence in the CIC sector. The option that was settled on was the creation of a self-
regulating two-tier structure.  
BSC would be an operating company overseen by a separate majority equity holding 
entity called the Big Society Trust. The Board of BSC would be accountable to the 
Board of the Trust, which would be tasked with ensuring that BSC remained 
committed to its social mission. The Board of the Trust, therefore, would have 
oversight of BSC’s activities and could challenge the senior management on the 
decisions they made or withhold consent should they disagree with a proposed 
strategy or investment. As an interviewee explained: 
The two main entities are an operating company - with a board - that is 
limited by shares and it is owned one third by the banks, in proportion to the 
equity stake in the company, and two thirds by a trust company.[currently the 
banks own 40% and 60% is owned by the trust] The trust company is limited 
by guarantee. The only corporate mission of the trust company is to make sure 
the company stays on mission.
18
 So, the trust company’s primary purpose is to 
make sure Big Society Capital Limited is working to build a sustainable social 
investment market. It has certain powers over the operating company, 
including a veto on any change to its mission…. Both shareholders have 
power over the investment policy, in particular what the target rate of return 
is 
This structure had, in fact, already been set out in the original proposal document 
written by O’Donohoe and Cohen (see Figure 2), so the remaining task was to 
hammer out the detail and to create the formal structures, an interviewee noted: 
And there was quite a lot of thought went into...what does this trust board 
need to look like, so we get two representatives from business and two to 
represent the social sector and so on...and what’s the protocol that needs to 
exist between the trust and the operating company. So it was quite...that is one 
of the more unique and innovative parts of this thing 
This governance structure was highly innovative – no exact equivalent was known in 
the UK at the time – and the team of people involved in creating BSC’s structure was 
aware that they were doing so without clear precedent. Furthermore, the governance 
structure created an unusual relationship with government. BSC had been incubated 
by government and bore the stamp of the Conservative Party’s political agenda in its 
                                               
18
 It also has responsibility for the (subsequently established) Access Foundation for Social 
Investment as its sole Trustee. 
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name, yet its governance structure separated it formerly from the control of policy 
makers.
19
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: BSC Proposed Governance Structure 
 
Negotiations With The High Street Banks 
 
The final issue to be resolved concerned the negotiations around agreeing an equity 
stake in BSC from the UK high street banks. 
 
The so-called ‘Merlin Banks’ played an important role in the creation of BSC.  
Since coming to power in May 2010, the new Coalition Government had been in 
negotiations with the four leading UK high street banks to improve commercial 
lending following their retrenchment after the banking crisis of 2008-10.
20
 ‘Project 
Merlin’, as it was called, was intended to reform aspects of banking activity such as 
lending, pay and bonuses to improve how banks supported the wider economy, in 
particular in terms of lending to SMEs. This led to a formal statement of intent 
between government and the banks: the Merlin Agreement.  
This Agreement covered a variety of topics and had much wider significance beyond 
its role in the creation of BSC.  Nevertheless, as part of these wide-ranging 
discussions, the government required the four Merlin Banks to invest £50m each in 
equity each into the nascent BSC. Interestingly, this agreement was made without any 
involvement from the core team at BSC – they were simply told that the agreement 
had already been made and that they would assume responsibility for finalising the 
terms of the subsequent equity deal.
21
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 The government – via one Cabinet Office representative – is a member of the Board of 
Trustees of the Big Society Trust but is not represented on the main Board. 
20
 Specifically HSBC, Lloyds, RBS and Barclays. 
21
 It was estimated that BSC would have access to at least £600m of total investable capital, 
made up of £200m in equity from the Merlin Banks and £400m from the dormant bank 
accounts. However, this latter figure would continue to grow at an estimated rate of £75m per 
year as new accounts passed the dormant definitional test. As a consequence, the total 
available pool of capital in the Reclaim Fund was estimated to be nearer to £1b by 2016 – 
though, of this sum, BSC was not guaranteed access to more than its original £400m. 
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Significantly, the banks imposed their own requirement on the overall terms of the 
agreement, an interviewee observed:  
The truth is...in the early hours of the morning, when we putting the final ink 
to this thing, somebody said from the bank... ‘we’ll do this Big Society Bank 
thing if you put in the word ‘commercial’. So, Treasury put it in, and nobody 
stopped to say ‘well let’s talk about what that actually means...’” 
This last-minute addition of the word ‘commercial’ to the terms of the agreement 
between the banks and the government laid the groundwork for an extremely 
challenging set of negotiations. O’Donohoe and Mason were now faced with trying to 
reconcile two quite different sets of motivations and incentives. 
From the Merlin Banks’ perspective, the investment was being made on commercial 
grounds, like any other investment in their portfolio. They wanted assurance that the 
investment would make a return, and that the team at BSC would adopt sound 
financial management. In particular, they were worried that BSC would operate like 
the previous government-backed funds aiming to capitalise the social sector that had 
ended up prioritising fund distribution above making sufficient returns to be 
sustainable over time.  
From BSC’s perspective, the organisation was intended to address the needs of social 
sector organisations rather than those of banks, using an approach that had never been 
tested before. It was not possible to say what kinds of rates they would be able to 
charge, the success rates of their investments, or the volumes of deals they would be 
able to find. To make a binding commitment to generate a positive return on the 
banks’ investments could risk undermining the entire project. 
In other words, the banks were treating the deal as if they were investing in an 
established firm from which they could expect positive returns. In contrast, from the 
perspective of BSC, the banks’ investment was an equity play in a high-risk, start-up, 
financial institution. In hindsight this difference is clear, and there might have been 
scope for BSC to push back on the banks’ demands and bring the government into the 
negotiations. At the time, however, the focus was on reaching an agreement quickly 
so the discussion revolved more around the intricate technicalities of agreed projected 
returns and the avenues of redress for the banks should BSC fail to meet its targets 
than around the larger issue of aiming for ‘commercial’ returns. 
After ‘tortuous’ negotiations, as one interviewee described them, agreement was 
finally reached with the Merlin Banks. BSC would set a target IRR of low to mid 
single digits and the banks would have the right to reject any business plan that 
projected a return of less than that specified return percentage. This agreement would 
have significant implications for the types of deals that BSC could do going forward 
(see further below). 
 
In practice, BSC decided to set its returns after a consideration of several issues 
including its market development role, a deal’s social impact and its financial 
sustainability. Importantly, BSC aimed to be sustainable across its portfolio of 
investments as a whole with the result that individual investments could have 
different levels of expected return. 
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After a period of nearly 10 years of discussion and development, BSC opened it doors 
for business in April 2012. 
 
BSC Operating Principles 
 
BSC is a distinctive financial institution with both unusual restrictions on its actions 
and some unique opportunities. This is largely because BSC sits within a nexus of 
several powerful stakeholder groups. The banks, the government and the Big Society 
Trust all have influence over its operations, as do the terms of the Dormant Bank 
Accounts Act. Thus, each investment BSC makes must take account of three 
objectives simultaneously: making a financial return, making a social return, and 
building the market for social investment.  
 
Moreover, the model of social investment being advocated by BSC relies on a cohort 
of social investment finance intermediaries being developed who are suitable to 
receive social investment, as well as a much larger number of frontline SSOs who are 
also prepared and able to take on repayable finance. In terms of capital to be 
deployed, BSC also operates on a scale that far exceeds any previous efforts in the 
UK. Once BSC began operations, it rapidly became clear that if it was going to 
function effectively it was going to need to reach SSOs that had never sought - or 
perhaps even thought about - taking on repayable finance.  
Finally, BSC was specifically set up to help provide financial and other support to 
social sector organisations. Therefore, regardless of the source of its capital, BSC is 
legally bound to pursue its stated social mission always. This carries with it a set of 
constraints in terms of building its business model and investment strategy. A number 
of other restrictions are also imposed on BSC as set out below. 
 
Investment Restrictions 
A significant restriction on the use of its funds is that BSC is unable to take part in 
‘place-based’ investing. Place-based investing takes as its key ‘social’ criterion the 
degree of deprivation in a given geographical community. The legal form of the 
investee organisation is, therefore, less important than its location. The social impact 
thesis of place-based investing rests on the assumption that geographically focussed 
investment can trigger a positive cycle of job creation and increased economic 
activity. Place-based investment is often viewed as a component of social investment 
more generally, but it is precluded by the terms of the Dormant Bank Accounts Act.  
By specifying that investment needed to be into SSOs, the Dormant Bank Accounts 
Act also prohibited investment into individuals. The ability to provide individual loans 
was a feature of CDFIs that wanted to encourage people in deprived areas to start 
their own businesses. While CDFIs could potentially take on investment from BSC, 
they could only do so if the investment money is not used to then make loans to 
individuals (or if it is invested in by another social finance intermediary).  
The Dormant Bank Accounts Act also placed restrictions on BSC’s investment in 
relation to the devolved administrations of the UK. Wales, Scotland and Northern 
Ireland all have the right to decide for themselves how their proportion of the 
unclaimed assets money should be used. The investments made by London-based 
BSC should, therefore, only be used for investments in England, save for the 
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proportion of capital represented by the Banks’ investments that does not have that 
same geographic requirement.
22
 
Interestingly, although the Act imposed restrictions on the type of organisation that 
could ultimately receive investment using BSC’s capital, no specifications were made 
regarding the intermediaries via whom investments could flow. Thus, any kind of 
organisation could act as an intermediary as long as they were making investments in 
SSOs. In addition, BSC had another mandate to invest into organisations that can 
provide ‘other support to third sector organisations’, such as infrastructure bodies. 
Rates of Return 
As described above, the Merlin Banks had agreed a minimum return on their equity 
investments.
23
 This meant that the banks could reject any long-term business plan 
from BSC that projected a rate lower than this expected level. It also meant that if 
BSC failed to generate the minimum return, the banks would have recourse to a series 
of interventions, an interviewee noted: 
If BSC doesn’t meet the target? It’s set out in the governance agreements 
between the banks and the Big Society Capital operating company, and it 
includes things like right to ask for meetings, right to see the management, and 
then it cascades into more and more serious measures  
However, in practice, as of 2016, BSC had not reached the target levels of return set 
out in the equity agreement with the banks. Indeed, at the time of writing, the 
organisation had not yet broken even, let alone generated a return on its capital. This 
situation casts an interesting light on the nature of the equity agreement with the 
Merlin Banks. On paper, the banks have a range of legal rights that they can exercise 
if BSC transgresses the terms of their agreement. Yet, the banks have not so far used 
these rights even though BSC’s performance has not met the agreed targets. The 
Banks have the right to meet the Senior Management of BSC (including the Chair) to 
discuss performance. 
One explanation for this is that the significance of the deal has declined in the eyes of 
the banks. Ultimately, £50m is a very small investment for a major high street bank to 
make, as one interviewee commented:  
I also know, based on my experiences with the banks, they agonize over the 
detail of an investment like this and as soon as they make it before you know 
where you are you’ve got some junior associate who’s responsible, because it 
just isn’t that important, and it isn’t that much money 
                                               
22
 Note, however, that no such restriction exists for the money from the Merlin Banks. Since 
the two sources of capital are pooled the upshot is that BSC does in fact make investments 
outside of England. 
23
 However, it was a common misconception, at least at the outset, that BSC had a baseline 
cost of capital related to the banks’ investment, when it fact each investment was assessed on 
a case-by-case basis without reference to the any figure. Currently, BSC describes itself as 
having a target return across its portfolio of 4-6%: see 
https://www.bigsocietycapital.com/assessment-and-co-development. 
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Moreover, it is likely that over time the banks developed a better understanding of 
what BSC was trying to achieve and realized that insisting on a specified level of 
returns could be seen as undermining the whole endeavour. Yet, BSC is, clearly, not 
able to ignore the terms imposed by the banks indefinitely, since it is seen as 
important for the institution to maintain the commercial credibility it has gained in the 
eyes of the banks (and the wider market) through the Merlin Banks negotiating 
process.  
BSC’s two sources of capital have, therefore, quite different restrictions attached to 
them. The dormant bank accounts money was restricted as to its destination, while the 
Merlin Banks’ equity investments were restricted in terms of the return profile of its 
investments. In the early stages of BSC, the option was on the table of keeping these 
sources of capital separate, meaning that the restrictions of one kind of capital did not 
apply to the other. This option was vetoed by the Cabinet Office amid concerns that 
the banks would be seen as ‘cherry picking’ the higher return options, an interviewee 
stated: 
When we first started negotiating with the banks, they wanted to have a 
separate pool of capital. And we were sympathetic to that. We went to the 
Cabinet Office and they said no way, they'll be seen as cherry picking. These 
are the bad people who caused the crash, they’re coming in on the same basis 
as everybody else. It’s got to be one pool of capital 
As a result all of BSC’s capital effectively goes into one ‘pool’ that is used as a single 
source of funds. This means all investments made by BSC are bound by all 
restrictions.  
Moreover, even without the constraints from the Merlin Banks, it became clear that 
managers felt it was a key part of BSC’s mission to show that it could be financially 
self-sustaining over time as a signal to the wider social investment market, where 
‘soft’ capital was often the norm. BSC had a clear strategy to protect its capital in real 
terms, cover its own operating costs, and make provision for losses – that is, the 
return on successful investments should be sufficient to cover the losses that are 
incurred when investments do not work out. BSC’s main source of income is the 
return it makes on its investments.
24
 
In addition to these practical financial realities, BSC is also trying to prove a point, it 
was noted:  
We are not finance first by any mean, but we have to be sustainable and 
protect a capital and a small return. If we don’t we are proving that social 
investment doesn’t work 
Above all, BSC was focussed on trying to demonstrate to investors and investees that 
the principles of social investment could work in practice to deliver social impact and 
sustainable financial returns. However, the need for financial discipline attracted 
widespread criticism in terms of its restriction on making more financially risky 
investments, even when the potential for significant social impact was clear. BSC 
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 BSC also makes some income from investments in its Treasury Account that contains 
transfers from the Reclaim Fund linked triggered by commitments but prior to actual 
investments. 
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was, therefore, seen by many as being too risk averse and incapable of offering the 
sort of small-scale, unsecured, lending perceived as being primarily needed by the 
social sector. 
 
Social Returns 
 
Of course, each investment made by BSC is also expected to generate measurable 
social returns. In general, this was much more unfamiliar territory to the management 
team working in the early days of BSC. Many of the staff came from a pure finance 
background and were familiar with the models and analysis used to make an 
investment on financial grounds, but less familiar with how consideration of social 
return might be integrated into their decision-making, an interviewee commented: 
My background is investment management, so in terms of the investment side 
of it, that was very familiar from what I’ve done before …. The difference for 
me was the social angle – the things we’re investing in is what’s 
different…I’ve never looked at homelessness or unemployment or any of those 
issues before 
The issue of social return is inextricably bound up with the issue of social impact 
measurement. The imperative to find ways consistently to measure and understand 
social impact, but without creating overly burdensome data requirements, is one of 
the thorniest issues facing social investment as a field of activity. The issue was 
particularly difficult for BSC as its investments are two steps removed from the 
frontline where social impact is being created. BSC has contact with SIFIs, but no 
direct contact with the organisations in which they go on to invest, as an interviewee 
noted. 
We’ve done some substantial work here recently on impact and what our role 
in impact measurement should be. I’d have to say that it is one of the areas 
that disappoints me, is the lack of progress that has been made. Not just the 
UK, globally. If I look back to where we were 5 years ago, there’s been an 
awful lot of resources spent by an awful lot of people … that is a testament to 
how horrendously difficult it is 
 
BSC spent some time considering how best to measure its social impact and 
concluded by developing a best-practice heuristic model known as the Outcomes 
Matrix.
25
 The Matrix captured a range of impact measurement approaches searchable 
by type of social impact intervention (mental health, employment, housing) and level 
of impact (individual, family, community). The resource was made publicly available. 
However, over time it became less clear how BSC themselves used the Outcomes 
Matrix. 
 
Building The Market for Social Investment  
 
On top of considering the financial and social return of each investment, BSC’s 
mission is also to build the market for social investment. ‘Market building’ is an 
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explicit consideration in each investment decision it makes. As set out in its 2013 
investment strategy,  
 
Market development means understanding how each prospective BSC 
investment helps strengthen a component of the social investment market, and 
how each investment contributes to a larger, more sustainable and diverse 
market.
26
 
 
Of course, BSC’s market-building activities extended beyond making individual 
investments. Staff members would spend significant time travelling around the 
country making presentations and spreading information about social investment. 
This was a matter of more and better communication, but it was also about searching 
out and actively targeting certain kinds of organisation in order to build the market, 
one staff member observed:  
 
If we want to do something in health, or we want to do something in Scotland, 
we want to do something in high risks small ticket size capital, we are going to 
have to go and – we are slowly beginning to realise that those are examples of 
where there is no provision of finance at all. So that is our role, right, to build 
the market. We are going to have to go and find intermediaries to help us 
develop proposals in that sense 
Pursuing BSC’s mission, thus, translated into a complex set of pressures and 
requirements, some of which were aligned and some of which were in tension with 
each other. One interviewee, for example, stated that some people within BSC 
interpreted their mission to be to preserve the value of their capital, whereas others 
interpreted it as building a functional marketplace, ‘which is not the same thing’.  
 
Interactions Between BSC and The Social Sector 
 
Finally, and importantly, BSC’s strategy was shaped by the needs and the demands of 
the social sector. The original justification for a social investment bank – to capitalise 
the social sector – grounded BSC’s mission in the needs of social enterprises and 
charities struggling to access capital from the mainstream market. 
 
Relations between BSC and the social sector were - at times - tense. Several 
interviewees commented that problems were exacerbated by the profile of the staff 
team at BSC: many of them came from a finance background and did not have a deep 
understanding of how the social sector worked. BSC was sometimes  interpreted as 
hostile and distant from the sector it was supposed to serve by some, it was noted:  
I think the – where we haven’t got it right – I think we talk or we are much 
closer to the financial than the social sector. So I don’t think we have got – 
this is partly reflected in the team, the structure of the organisation – on a 
staff level, not a board level, that actually we are not close enough to the 
social sector. And the social sector therefore sees us as a bit distant, a bit 
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hostile, a bit not really understanding what their needs are. Now I think 
there’s work that we need to do to get closer to the social sector, and to get 
the DNA of the social sector within the bank 
Another interviewee pointed out that the strategy they had taken was to create the 
market from the top down first and that this was not universally popular, 
This is a very ‘build-it and they will come’ approach to the market. One 
legitimate question is can you build it the other way around, focusing on the 
investment readiness, focusing on sources, where is the customer, focusing on 
a much more organic approach? With building a wholesaler model comes 
some risk. And it is a sort of supply-side first. But what it does is it shakes it up 
and it gets everyone to notice. Whether logically it is the only way to build the 
market, I think it is probably not the only way and it is also way too early to 
say whether it is the right way 
Nevertheless, despite this top-down approach, BSC was still reliant on a pipeline of 
SSOs that were ready and willing to take on social investment. The type and price of 
capital BSC offered, therefore, needed to be acceptable to at least a baseline number 
of SSOs. As a result, considerable flexibility was adopted in investment decision-
making, one interviewee commented,  
Basically, the way we price our capital… is three things: one is we have to 
protect our capital in real terms, we have to cover our operating costs, and we 
have to have provision for losses. … The way we actually work, practically, is 
that we sell to the problem, so that if someone comes to us with a model, we 
look at it, and we say ‘well, we think it is this, they think it is that’ – we kind of 
to and fro. But basically we have things in our portfolio which are down at 3% 
and other at 12% and all the way along - and it always depends whether it is 
equity, Internal Rate of Return…  So there is no standard pricing at all. And it 
is a complete misconception in the market that we do 
The initial flow of deals was, nevertheless, slower than had been hoped and BSC 
struggled to source many deals in its first two years of operation – though this 
improved considerably from 2015 onwards. 
To support its pipeline development, BSC successfully advocated for the development 
of Social Investment Tax Relief, which became law in 2014. This is a new tax relief, 
agreed by HM Treasury, to incentivise individual investors to invest risk capital into 
certain smaller regulated SSOs, and receive a 30% tax break as a result. This aimed to 
create a new supply of social investment capital incentivized to take lower rates of 
returns compensated by a tax break. After the first two years of operation, 30 SITR 
deals had been completed amounting to £3.4m of assets under management.
27
 
In a second market building initiative, in 2015, BSC announced a new institution that 
was designed to help increase deal-flow by means of targeted capacity support and a 
fund for small-scale loans to SSOs including grants and loans: Access, the Foundation 
for Social Investment. Capitalized with £100m (partly by the loan capital repaid to the 
Futurebuilders funds), this was positioned as a sister organization to BSC with its 
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team even located in the same office. The hope was that it would help seed a larger 
pool of potential investees within the social sector and, in the process, build a robust a 
pipeline of future investments for BSC.  
Summary 
This case study has mapped out the complex story of how, over nearly a decade, Big 
Society Capital came into being as the world’s first social investment wholesaler. It 
has also highlighted it unique features and complex strategic aims. Several issues can 
be highlighted: 
 The resources and persistence of a small group of influential individuals was 
very important throughout, as were their connections at the highest levels of 
politics. In the case of BSC, Sir Ronald Cohen played a pivotal role in this 
regard 
 It took a number of years for the project to develop. The idea for a social 
investment wholesale bank dovetailed with wider agendas supporting 
community development finance and social enterprise and the recognition of 
the potential to access funds from dormant bank accounts. But these ideas 
needed constant support and proselytizing 
 BSC’s emergence was also a function of patience and careful positioning. For 
example, key advocates carefully manoeuvred themselves into a position from 
where they were able to take advantage of a change in government in 2010. 
There was also a favourable policy context at a European level that ensured no 
obstructions through the State Aid approval process 
 The development of BSC was not administered in a particularly transparent 
manner. Beyond the initial consultations, it was driven by a group of 
individuals who worked closely with the Cabinet Office and did not appear to 
consider themselves accountable to the social sector more generally. It is up 
for debate whether they could have been as effective as they were if they had 
taken a more open and inclusive approach 
 Once founded, BSC needed to be adaptable and responsive to the market – 
this required it to be more flexible about financial returns than it had originally 
intended. It also led to the establishment of the Access Foundation as an 
acknowledgment of the need for capacity building around investment 
readiness in the social sector 
 As of 2016, BSC had still not broken even. One of the main reasons behind 
this is that interest rates have remained so low, so they earn very little on the 
money in their Treasury Account
28
 
 Relations may have improved between BSC and the social sector but 
scepticism remains as to the true potential of social investment to provide 
capital in a format that is suitable for most SSOs 
 BSC has played a leading role in developing new social investment initiatives, 
such as Social Investment Tax Relief, that can benefit SSOs without 
necessarily involving BSC capital 
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 Debates have also opened up regarding where the boundaries of the social 
sector lie – evidenced, for example, by the introduction of B-Corps (Benefit 
Corporations) into the UK in 2015. These have also revealed some of the 
difficulties of matching the demands of social investment with the embedded 
practices, structures and normative conventions of the social sector. In this 
context, it seems likely that BSC will be an influential player in arguing for a 
definition of social investment that includes capital invested in ‘profit-with-
purpose’ organizations. Such organizations are not social enterprises or 
charities but, rather, conventional businesses that have some (as yet 
unspecified) social mission evidenced in their governance structure. Profit-
with-purpose organizations may offer both better returns and larger scale 
investments to BSC – two things that may be strategically necessary for its 
long-term survival 
Conclusion 
In 2013, Sir Ronald Cohen stood down as Chairman of BSC (but remained on the 
Board of BSC) and was replaced by Sir Harvey McGrath. McGrath was a 
distinguished career financier with an interest in the social sector and had formerly 
been Chairman of both the Prudential PLC and Man Group PLC. This significant 
change was followed, in 2015, by Nick O’Donohoe stepping down as the first CEO of 
BSC. He was replaced by Cliff Prior, the former CEO of UnLtd. By the end of 2015 
BSC had 44 full-time staff and outgrew its first head office in Fleet Street moving 
instead to new offices in New Fetter Lane. 
 
Several pressing issues were on the agenda for the new senior management team to 
address. Definitional issues continued to cause BSC difficulty, notably the issue of 
what was eligible for investment as a front-line organisation and as an intermediary 
(especially in terms of SSOs working in financial inclusion). Capital drawdown had 
been slow. A focus on creating new institutions and new products had meant long 
design periods before investments could reach the front line. Moreover, closing deals 
after a commitment had been made had taken far longer than expected. Fundraising 
for co-investment for its deals had proved harder than expected with more interest 
than investment in evidence. Moreover, some products wanted by SSOs had proved 
challenging to provide – mainly small, unsecured loans, which were seen as 
financially unsustainable. 
 
Despite these issues, the figures for 2015, suggested that BSC has met its objective 
for a 1:1 match for signed deals as a wholesaler: a total of £195m had been drawn 
down to fund investments including £68m from BSC itself (see Appendix 6). 
Moreover, £587m of future investments had also been signed off, of which BSC’s 
commitment amounted to £261m. By these measures BSC was making good progress 
in terms of its objectives around market building and match funding. What remained 
to be seen was how well these investments would perform financially or, perhaps 
most importantly, what their overall social impact would be. 
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Appendix 1: Membership of the Social Investment Task Force 
 
Original Members 
 
 Sir Ronald Cohen (Chairman) – Chairman of Bridges Ventures, Chairman of 
The Portland Trust and Director of Social Finance  
 David Carrington – Independent Consultant  
 Ian Hargreaves (initial phase) – former Editor of New Statesman and Director 
of Cardiff University Centre for Journalism Studies  
 Philip Hulme – co-founder of Computacenter and founder of the Hadley Trust  
 Geraldine Peacock, CBE – former Chair of the Charities Commission 
 Joan Shapiro – Chair of SeerAnalytics, LLC and former Executive Vice 
President of ShoreBank, Chicago  
 Tom Singh, OBE (initial phase) – founder of New Look 
 
Subsequent Members 
 
 Dawn Austwick, OBE – Chief Executive of the Esmée Fairbairn Foundation 
 Michele Giddens – Executive Director of Bridges Ventures  
 Andrew Gowers – former Editor of Financial Times  
 Ben Kernighan – Deputy Chief Executive of the National Council for 
Voluntary Organisations  
 Ed Mayo – Secretary General of Co-operatives UK  
 David Orr – Chief Executive of the National Housing Federation  
 Danny Truell – Chief Investment Officer of the Wellcome Trust  
 Stewart Wallis, OBE – Executive Director of the New Economics Foundation 
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Appendix 2: Membership of the Commission on Unclaimed Assets 
 
 Sir Ronald Cohen (Chair) – Chair, Social Investment Taskforce, Bridges 
Community Ventures and The Portland Trust, and Honorary President, 
Community Development Finance Association  
 David Carrington – Independent Consultant  
 Andrew Gowers – Head of Corporate Communications, Lehman Brothers 
Europe and former Editor, Financial Times 
 Susan Hitch – Chair, Balance Foundation 
 Bernard Horn – Former Group Board Member of Nat West Bank 
 Ed Mayo – Chief Executive, National Consumer Council  
 Baroness Jill Pitkeathly – House of Lords, former Chair of New Opportunities 
Fund 
 Geraldine Peacock – Former Chair, Charity Commission 
 Danielle Walker–Palmour – Director, Friends Provident Foundation 
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Appendix 3: The Big Society Bank (“BSB”) Outline Proposal29 
May 2011 
Introduction 
The BSB has a critical role to play in developing and shaping a sustainable market for 
social investment in the UK, giving social sector organisations access to new sources 
of finance to help increase their social impact. The BSB will also act as social 
investment champion with the public, stakeholders and investors. 
The policy framework for the BSB is set out in HM Government’s February 2011 
document “Growing the Social Investment Market: A vision and strategy” and this 
proposal is presented in accordance with that document. 
We have consulted with leading organisations from the social sector and have also 
discussed responses that the Cabinet Office received following the Ministerial 
announcement of 21 March which invited comments on the development of the 
proposal. 
We recommend that the parent company of the Group be named “The Big Society 
Trust”, with an operating company as its subsidiary and a separate entity capable of 
receiving charitable donations to support the Group’s mission. The BSB Group is 
described in this document as the “BSB”. 
Section 1 below sets out the proposed Mission, Objectives and Operating Principles 
of the BSB. Section 2 sets out how it would fulfil its twin objectives of acting as a 
wholesale investor as well as a driver for development of the sector. Section 3 
outlines its proposed legal structure, governance, regulatory framework and 
accounting policies. Section 4 summarises its proposed management team, 
organisation structure and the policies and procedures it will adopt. Section 5 
summarises its assumptions regarding capital structure, commentary on financial 
outcomes and proposed interim arrangements prior to State Aid clearance from the 
EU. 
Section 1: Mission, Objectives and Operating Principles 
The social sector, through its charitable investors and social organisations, already 
plays a significant role in tackling social issues. Its capacity to achieve maximum 
social impact is, however, severely constrained by a number of factors and in 
particular by its inability to access investment capital and its heavy dependence on 
donor finance. Removal of these constraints will enhance its capacity to deal 
effectively with important social issues such as: 
 Achieving better attendance at schools;   
 Supporting disabled people and other disadvantaged groups into the 
workplace; 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 Reducing homelessness and boosting affordable housing;   
 Reducing re-offending and promoting better alternatives to custody, 
particularly for younger people;   
 Delivering better outcomes for vulnerable children;   
 Delivering better prospects for chaotic families;   
 Providing better access to drug and alcohol rehabilitation programmes;   
 Improving healthcare in the community and reducing the need for hospital 
admissions;  
 Boosting preventative action in order to reduce the strain on the health system 
from chronic diseases;   
 Improving access to and control over finance for individuals excluded from 
mainstream banking;   
 Achieving effective mixed use of community assets, thereby enhancing 
community cohesion;  
 and  Encouraging entrepreneurship to stimulate employment in under-
invested areas. 
The BSB Mission and Objectives 
The BSB’s mission will be to boost significantly the ability of the social sector to deal 
with social issues. It will do this by supporting the development of a social investment 
market which is more effective in attracting capital to achieve social impact. 
The BSB’s objectives will be to help: 
 Develop intermediaries to operate effectively between sources of capital and 
those in need, be they social ventures or individuals, and so to augment the 
flow of investment and skills to the social sector;   
 Connect social entrepreneurs to the capital markets so that they can access 
growth capital;  
 Support financial innovation so that social organisations can be rewarded for 
their performance in delivering valued social outcomes; 
 Develop the investor market through the creation of social investment vehicles 
that support high growth ventures, as well as smaller local organisations; 
and   
 Support the development of community-led, social enterprise initiatives to 
improve opportunities for young people. 
Through its capacity to invest debt and equity, to co-invest with other investors and 
occasionally to protect investors against the risk of loss, the BSB will have the ability 
to accelerate the establishment of diversified social purpose funds, such as venture 
funds, property funds, community asset funds, microfinance funds and funds that 
invest in social impact bonds. Such funds will provide social and management 
expertise as well as investment capital to social ventures capable of expanding to 
deliver significant social impact as well as a financial return. 
The BSB will spur development of the market infrastructure necessary to boost social 
entrepreneurship and investment by supporting the growth of existing and new 
intermediaries that can: 
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 Develop robust investment propositions with clearly articulated social and 
financial risks and returns;   
 Provide reliable independent research on social investment opportunities and 
organisations; and 
 Create effective financial markets to trade and issue securities. 
An effective social investment market is crucial for social entrepreneurs whether they 
seek to scale existing organisations, to create new social ventures or to migrate social 
activities out of the public sector. Making capital, expertise and management skills 
available to social entrepreneurs, as they have become available to business 
entrepreneurs, is crucial to sustaining a powerful wave of social entrepreneurship. 
Operating Principles 
We support the adoption of the four operating principles for the BSB set out in HM 
Government’s February 2011 document “Growing the Social Investment Market: A 
vision and strategy”. These are: Independence from government, Acting as a 
wholesaler, Transparency and Self-sufficiency. 
Independence 
We have proposed a legal and governance structure (Section 3) which we believe 
meets the needs of the BSB. The parent company limited by guarantee (the “CLG”) 
would be responsible for maintaining over time adherence to the founding mission of 
the BSB. A private subsidiary company limited by shares (the “CLS”) would be the 
operating vehicle of the BSB. The CLS would be independent of government but 
accountable to the CLG Board which would include a government representative. 
Transparency 
The CLS would be managed according to the principles of corporate governance set 
out in the Financial Reporting Council Code. The BSB would publish detailed annual 
accounts including details of the financial and social impact of its investments and 
would act as a focal point for the sharing of information and expertise across the 
social investment sector. 
Wholesaler 
Our proposed investment policy assumes that the CLS would invest across a spectrum 
of equity, quasi equity and debt in intermediaries. Under the legislation, which will 
require clarification in due course, it cannot invest directly in individual social service 
providers. In its capacity building role, the CLS can invest directly if need be in new 
social organisations that add to the social investment market’s infrastructure, such as 
impact measurement organisations, securities exchange platforms and investment 
portals. We propose that the BSB should initially be managed as an unlevered 
institution which would not seek a banking licence. 
Self Sufficiency 
The BSB would, in time, cover its operating costs from the return on its investments. 
Our financial modelling suggests that this self-sufficiency could be achieved after an 
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initial period of five years or so during which there would be some attrition of the 
BSB’s capital. 
Section 2: The BSB as wholesale investor and social investment champion 
The BSB will have two key roles, as a wholesale investor and as a social investment 
champion. 
Wholesale investor 
The success of the BSB in achieving its mission will be driven largely by the 
deployment of its investment assets. It will provide long-term capital to support the 
growth of intermediaries and the infrastructure of an effective social investment 
market. Much of its investment portfolio will comprise assets whose returns are 
uncertain and whose liquidity is poor. In many respects, the closest parallel is a 
venture capital fund. The BSB will need to set an appropriate level of investment risk 
to achieve its social mission, while making sufficient financial returns to cover its 
operating costs and investment losses. 
In estimating the financial returns of the BSB, we have drawn on the experience of 
the small number of financial intermediaries currently active in the sector. We have 
also taken into account investment proposals made to NESTA’s Big Society Finance 
Fund. 
The BSB will not be a grant-making organisation. Funds deployed will therefore seek 
both financial and social returns. It is expected, however, that it will often partner 
with grant-making institutions such as the Big Lottery Fund (BLF), NESTA and 
foundations that share the BSB’s objectives. 
We are mindful of the need for a wide regional spread of investments across the UK 
and this will be a factor in decision-making. 
In modelling the financial performance of the BSB, we have split the demand for 
capital into five categories: 
1. Co-investment of equity or debt in social-purpose funds managed by 
intermediaries;  
2. Provision of subordinated capital to social investment intermediaries and 
funds;  
3. Investment in existing intermediaries;  
4. Investment in infrastructure organisations; and  
5. Investment and underwriting for innovative financial products.  
 
1. Co-investments in funds 
The BSB will help fund-raising by acting, where appropriate, as a cornerstone 
investor in funds. Returns will vary widely from double digit to low single digit or 
even negative returns. Some venture capital- oriented funds may take five years or 
more to start returning capital and some socially-oriented funds may have little 
chance of third party exit and may achieve a pay-back only over a long time through 
participating securities entitled to receive a share of revenues or profits. 
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2. Subordinated capital 
As part of the financing support it provides, the BSB will extend affordable loan 
finance, often in conjunction with equity or quasi-equity investment. 
3. Investment in existing intermediaries 
The BSB will strengthen the balance sheets of intermediaries and help to accelerate 
the growth of social organisations. Equity investments are likely to be held for the 
long term with limited running yield. 
4. Investment in infrastructure organisations 
It is critical if the BSB is to achieve its mission that it invests in the infrastructure of 
the sector. This requires the investment of long-term capital. Given the risks and long 
holding periods associated with such investments, they are likely to be structured as 
redeemable equity whose returns are dependent on revenues or profits. 
5. Investment and underwriting for innovative financial products. 
This category includes innovative financing products as well as commitments that the 
BSB might make by way of guarantees or underwriting. 
As social impact bonds and other forms of outcomes-linked finance establish a track 
record of correlated social and financial returns, these types of investment are likely 
to enjoy strong growth. 
To the extent that the BSB insures against first loss or takes underwriting risk, these 
exposures will be limited to a small proportion of its assets. 
Social investment champion 
The BSB will aim to create a market environment in which mainstream investors can 
find easy access to social investment vehicles and social organisations can attract 
capital from varied sources. Achieving these objectives will necessitate accelerated 
product innovation, process standardisation and a common understanding of best 
practice. 
The long term success of the BSB will be measured by its multiplier effect, both 
financially and in terms of social impact. Financially, this will be measured by the 
amount of capital it succeeds in attracting to social investment as well as the growth 
and sustainability of the social investment market. In terms of social impact, it will be 
measured by the growth of significant intermediaries as well as growth in the number 
and scale of social organisations. Over the next two decades, its success will be 
reflected in the establishment of social investment as an accepted asset class. 
The BSB will focus its efforts on the following areas: 
Information sharing and networking 
The BSB will seek to become a hub, connecting social enterprises with capital and 
support. It will do this by: 
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 Providing web site access to industry data and market research;   
 Arranging events to promote social investment and best practice;   
 Connecting, via its web platform, enquiries from front-line organisations 
seeking capital to a range of intermediaries; and   
 Providing relevant information to the sector on government incentives and 
policies. 
Research 
The BSB will communicate research on such areas as:   
 Best practice and replicable models;   
 Developments in the social investment marketplace;  
 Guides to new products and initiatives; 
 Analysis of financial risks and returns across social investments;   
 Social impact measurement; and   
 Policy initiatives outside the UK and their relevance for the domestic market. 
Capacity Building 
The BSB will boost market capacity. It will do this by:   
 Encouraging the development of robust intermediaries able to promote best 
practice among front-line organisations;   
 Working with grant-makers to support initiatives directed at investment 
readiness;   
 Facilitating access by social ventures to sources of investment capital; and   
 Supporting the creation of a secondary market in social investment securities. 
Promoting best practice 
The BSB’s investment policies will typically require provision of finance to be linked 
with measurable social impact. It will also seek to ensure that best practice in areas 
such as governance, finance, risk control, social performance metrics and the use of 
innovative financial instruments is disseminated across the social sector.  
Specifically the BSB will: 
 Promote transparency of intermediaries in the utilisation of funds provided by 
the BSB;   
 Publish in its Annual Report details of the social and financial performance of 
its investments;  
 Promote innovative products such as Social Impact Bonds that link investment 
returns to social outcomes; and   
 Promote initiatives that help communities to raise local capital for local 
provision of services. 
Market development 
The BSB will provide advice, in partnership with others where appropriate, on the 
social sector and on incentives to stimulate market development. It will do this 
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through: 
 Advice to government on the needs of the social investment market, on 
relevant incentives and on opportunities to open public services to social 
ventures;   
 Appropriate support and advice to regulators such as the FSA and Charity 
Commission on measures to develop the social investment market, reduce the 
cost of raising finance and increase broader participation by the investment 
community; and 
 Partnership with banks to promote increased commitment to the social 
investment market in new product development, distribution, research, lending 
and investment. 
Section 3: Legal Structure, Governance, Regulation and Accounting 
We propose the structure set out below which, in our view, responds best to the legal 
and governance requirements pertaining to the BSB. 
 
The BSB’s operating entity would be a private UK company limited by shares (the 
“CLS”). The principal advantage of a company limited by shares versus a company 
limited by guarantee is that it permits new equity investment and retains maximum 
flexibility to respond to possible needs for future capital. The mission and objectives 
of the CLS would be enshrined in its Memorandum and Articles of Association 
(“constitutional documents”). 
There is no advantage in seeking PLC status as there is no present intention to offer 
shares in the CLS to the public at large. 
The ordinary shares of the CLS would be held by a private company limited by 
guarantee (the “CLG”). 
The BSB’s structure includes a charitable foundation whose purpose would be to 
receive charitable donations aimed at supporting the BSB’s mission, for example, by 
way of grants to venture philanthropy organisations whose purpose is to increase the 
investment readiness of strategic social organisations. 
The £200m investment to be made by the Merlin banks (Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and 
RBS) remains to be finalised. We commend the principle that the Merlin banks 
should supply long term permanent capital. We recommend that the Merlin banks’ 
capital is senior to the unclaimed assets in the event of liquidation. 
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CLG Structure 
The CLG structure would comprise a Board of eight Directors including the Chair of 
the CLS. The CEO of the CLS would have the right of attendance at CLG Board 
meetings in an observer capacity. The CLS Chair and CEO would be excused from 
CLG Board discussions where a conflict of interest occurs. The CLG Board’s overall 
responsibility is to ensure that the CLS remains true to its social mission and it would 
have specific powers in this regard to remove the CLS Board if it felt this to be 
necessary. 
The CLG Board would have the following composition: 
 Two leaders of leading social sector organisations  
 Two leaders of leading national organisations  
 Two social sector nominees   
 One representative selected by Government 
 The Chair of the CLS 
The CLG Board would select as Chair the most suitable candidate for the position. 
However, neither the Government representative nor the CLS representative would be 
eligible. 
The CLG would meet once or twice a year. It would have access to CLS Board papers 
and reports. It would have specific powers: 
 To remove the Directors of the CLS if it ceases to be managed in line with its 
constitutional documents;   
 To approve any proposed changes to the CLS’s stated Mission and Objectives 
or to its constitutional documents; and 
 To approve any changes to the stated remuneration policy or appointments 
policy of the CLS. 
The CLS would provide funding as well as secretarial and ancillary support to the 
CLG. The Directors of the CLG would be unpaid. 
CLS Structure 
The Board 
The role of the Board would be to support the efforts of the executive team and to 
hold it accountable for its performance according to the remit set by the constitutional 
documents of the CLS and CLG. 
The Board would comprise a balance of skills and experience. Roughly half of the 
Board’s members would have financial or business backgrounds and half would bring 
deep knowledge of the social sector. Several Board members would have overlapping 
skills in both social issues and finance. 
The Board would initially comprise 9 - 10 people of whom 7 - 8 would be non-
executive including a Chair with a financial background. The Chair would be elected 
by the Board. The roles of Chair and CEO would be separate and the CEO and either 
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the COO or the CFO of the CLS would be members of the Board. 
The CLS would have regard to the Main Principles laid down by the FRC Code, and 
amended from time- to-time, as if the CLS were a public limited company. 
The Articles would give the Directors the power to make donations to the BSB’s 
Foundation. Such donations could become appropriate if regular profits were made by 
the CLS. 
The Board will initially meet monthly. Once the CLS has become fully operational, 
the Board would probably meet four to six times a year. 
Directors would generally serve for terms of three years and would be submitted for 
re-election on a staggered basis. No non-executive director including the Chair could 
serve for a period greater than nine years. The CLS would need to inform the CLG 
before co-opting an individual to its Board if an appointment is contemplated prior to 
formal nomination. 
Candidates for Board membership would be appointed following a formal process led 
by a Nomination Committee of the Board to which the Board would appoint a 
combination of internal and external members. Candidates short-listed by the 
Nomination Committee would be interviewed and the final decision would rest with 
the Board, with due regard to the 50/50 balance of Board member expertise in social 
and financial matters and to the expertise required for a sophisticated financial 
institution operating in the social sector. 
The company would arrange appropriate legal indemnity cover for its Directors. 
The Advisory Board 
The object of this group is to bring prominent practitioners from the social, financial 
and business sectors to advise the CEO and help drive speedier implementation of the 
BSB’s programme. It would comprise up to 15 people. Members would be appointed 
by the Board on the recommendation of the CEO to serve for a period of two years at 
a time on a staggered basis. The Advisory Board would meet twice a year. 
The Investment Committee 
This group would comprise executives of the CLS. Directors of the CLS could serve 
on the Investment Committee subject to exclusion from decisions where conflicts 
might arise. 
The Remuneration Committee 
The Remuneration Committee would be composed of non-executive directors of the 
CLS. It would set remuneration policy for CLS’s senior management team. The 
committee would receive evidence on internal and external trends in remuneration 
and benefits, including commissioned reports and surveys where necessary. 
The CLS Articles would enshrine the principles of its remuneration policy, with 
changes subject to the approval of the CLG Board. 
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The remuneration policy for the senior management of the CLS would be designed to 
attract talented individuals who are highly motivated by the BSB’s social mission. 
The remuneration policy would: 
1. Adhere to the principle of benchmarking remuneration by reference to other 
significant social sector organisations;  
2. Provide fair remuneration commensurate with individual responsibility and 
contribution, including the potential to reward junior and middle ranking 
staff for outstanding performance during a year; and  
3. Have due regard to any relevant legal requirements, the provisions and 
recommendations in the UK Corporate Governance code and associated 
guidance.  
Details of remuneration levels paid to the Directors and to the highest paid staff 
would be disclosed in the Annual Report as would any remuneration paid to non-
executive directors. 
Other committees of the CLS Board would include audit and risk committees. 
Charitable Foundation 
This entity would be incorporated by guarantee with charitable status. Its purpose is to 
receive donations and put charitable funds to work in direct support of the CLS’s 
mission to develop powerful intermediaries and a thriving social sector, with a 
particular focus on investment readiness. It would not provide grants alongside CLS 
investments. 
The foundation would receive philanthropic donations from third parties as well as 
such monies as the Board of the CLS decided to donate if profits were regularly 
generated in the CLS. 
The Trustees would include some members of the CLS Board as well as external 
figures with relevant experience who share a strong commitment to the BSB’s 
mission. 
Regulation and Accounting Policies 
The CLS will be regulated by the FSA. There is no current intention to become a bank 
or to seek a banking licence though this may become appropriate in the longer term. 
The CLS has a choice between adopting UK GAAP and IFRS. 
The CLS would produce an Annual Report to the standards of a major listed UK 
public company incorporating its social and financial performance. Its accounts will 
be audited by a leading firm of auditors. 
Section 4: Management and Organisation Structure, Policies and Procedures 
Organisational structure 
Set out below is an organisation chart for the CLS. 
Management 
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The senior executive team would comprise the CEO, COO, CFO, Head of 
Investments, Head of Social Investment Banking Services and Head of 
Communications. Of this group, the CEO and another executive director would be 
members of the Board. Other senior executives would include compliance and risk 
officers. 
 
Once funding is available, the core team would be recruited to establish the CLS and 
to set in place a recruitment process to enlarge the team. 
The CLS will wish to build up expertise within its team but it will use existing 
intermediaries where possible as a cost-effective alternative to employment. The CLS 
will also seek to attract talented individuals on secondment from institutions in the 
social, government, financial and business sectors as a way of retaining flexibility, 
reducing costs and spreading understanding of the social sector and social issues. Its 
recruitment policy will conform to best practice standards. 
We have assumed an initial team of about 10 largely senior executives and that the 
team would grow to some 20-25 people reasonably shortly after the launch of the 
BSB, though with a cautious approach focused on recruiting team members with the 
appropriate skills. 
Operating Costs 
The CLS will in general use a combination of full time employees, part-time 
employees, secondees and consultants to maintain a lean management and 
organisational structure. The principal elements of operating cost will be people and 
premises, with significant spend likely to be incurred in areas such as product 
development, market research, communication and championing activities focused on 
the public, stakeholders and investors. 
Policies and Procedures 
The BSB will adopt standard policies and procedures for risk management. 
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The Investment Committee will be appointed by the Board on the recommendation of 
the CEO. The CLS will require regular reporting about the performance of its 
investments in funds and will share with the public on an annual basis information 
about the social impact and financial returns achieved. 
The Investment Committee will undertake a portfolio review at least on a semi-annual 
basis and will adjust the values of each investment. The annual independent audit 
review would require a full discussion of fair value and impairment. 
Compliance and risk management policies would include approvals of new 
investments and conflicts of interest. 
Section 5: Capital Structure, Operating Costs, Financial Modelling, Interim 
Arrangements 
Capital Structure 
It is our understanding that the Minister for the Cabinet Office will instruct the BLF to 
transfer unclaimed assets to the CLS for no consideration. 
We assume that monies from the Merlin banks will be paid to the CLS in exchange 
for non-assignable securities. 
For purposes of modelling, we have assumed that the CLS would receive over a 
period of five years all of the English portion of the dormant bank accounts money 
(which has been estimated at around £400m for the whole of the UK) and that the 
Merlin banks’ investment of £200m is received in stages over the first two years. 
Operating costs 
It is expected that the CLS will number about 40 people in total when fully 
operational. Staff costs are modelled as salaries plus social charges with no allowance 
for performance-based pay. Consultant costs assume that the CLS would receive 
advice on a range of issues. 
Premises costs assume a location in London’s outer West End. 
Financial modelling and possible outcomes 
We have modelled a range of allocations to the categories of investment outlined in 
Section 2 above. There is limited data on which to place reliance. Modelling 
assumptions are based on a balance between social investments which are likely to 
yield positive returns and social investments where returns are likely to be uncertain. 
In our view, there will be some attrition of the initial capital over the first five years or 
so due to the gradual inflows of funds from unclaimed assets, the need to cover initial 
operating costs, the elevated weighted average risk of the portfolio and the time lag 
before returns are achieved. However, our modelling indicates that on the central 
assumptions adopted, the BSB will earn a return on its investments sufficient to cover 
its operating costs within five years or so after its launch. 
In the longer term, once the CLS reaches self-sufficiency, it may be appropriate to 
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leverage the institution moderately in order to increase the capital that can be 
deployed to increase social impact. 
Interim Arrangements 
It is assumed that an interim committee will be established by the Big Lottery Fund to 
make investments from dormant bank account monies during the period prior to State 
Aid approval. It has been assumed that any investments made would be transferred to 
the CLS at accounting fair value for no consideration once the CLS commences 
operations. 
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Appendix 4: Board of Directors (2016) 
 Sir Harvey McGrath – Chair, BSC 
 Cliff Prior – CEO, BSC 
 Sir Ronald Cohen – Non-Executive Director, BSC 
 Anne Wade – Director, Heron Foundation 
 Dai Powell – CEO, HCT Group 
 David Carrington – Independent Consultant 
 Danielle Walker-Palmour – Director, Friends Provident Foundation 
 Fiona Ellis – Independent Consultant 
 Keith Smithson - Managing Director, Treasury at Barclays 
 Sarah Smart – Director, SmartCats Consulting 
 Susan Rice - Chair of Scottish Water 
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Appendix 5: Board of Trustees, Big Society Trust (2016) 
 Baroness Jill Pitkeathley – Chair, House of Lords, former Chair of New 
Opportunities Fund 
 Sir Stephen Bubb - Ex Officio, CEO ACEVO, rotating with NCVO 
 Peter Holbrook - Ex Officio, CEO Social Enterprise UK 
 Helen Stephenson - Ex Officio, appointed by the Accounting Officer for the 
Cabinet Office 
 Robin Budenberg - London Chairman of Centerview Partners 
 Stephen Howard - CEO of Business in the Community,  
 John Kingston - Chair of Access: The Foundation for Social Investment 
 Harvey McGrath – Chair, Big Society Capital 
 David Robinson – Founder Community Links  
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Appendix 6: BSC Capital Allocation (2012-2015) 
 
